g payments and directly regulating commodity marketing or input use. These same programs also influence the parameters of estimated supply functions, and in particular, affect the acreage response to market reveal the al acreage response eriod from which the data are generated. In this article we develop and apply an approach that uses detailed information about farm program incentives and constraints to identify underlying structural ernment . We illustrate the States. In 1996, and 2002 program rules changed substantially. Structural parameters are needed to assess acreage response to market price under the new policies and to project acreage response under empirical analysis indicates that, for U.S. rice, structural acreage response to market price is three to four times larger than acreage response under program features that were in place from 1986 to 1995. Thus, if they were used to represent structural acreage response, estimates that fail to appropriately incorporate the program rules would be biased down by a factor of three to four.
Introduction
Acreage response to commodity price is a core issue of agricultural economics. Assessing long ago as 1938, Galbraith and Black, using the U.S. experience from the dep provided evidence that farm supply was extremely inelastic. However, in a clas
Johnson showed that the Galbraith and Black analysis confounded movements than had been implied by a less sophisticated examination of the data.
In the half century since Johnson wrote, U.S. crop supply has continued influenced by a complex set of farm commodity programs that affected acreage response to market price. This article considers the influence of farm c alternative programs, or under no program at all, it is vital to understand in farm programs have affected crop supply in the data available for analysis (Ruc for analysis outside of the policy framework that generated the data. on crop acreage e farm policies. ilar to the programs for wheat, feed grains and cotton, the rice program has accounted for an even larger share of industry revenue and was central to supply decisions of virtually all producers. and price armers. It is therefore equately account for these factors, nor is it a simple exercise to account for these complexities. However, by understanding the specific influence of policy rules on individual producer behavior, we can those policy rules.
rt is particularly relevant as farm programs change, because we seldom have the needed lyze acreage response under the currently observed farm program. Thus iden as analysis of policy alternatives. alled an effective support price (Houck and Ryan (1972) , Bailey and Womack (1985) , Duffy, Richardson, and Wohlgenant (1987) , and Duffy, Shalishali, and Kinnucan (1994) , Chen and Ito (1992) A third approach used by Just (1993) , Labson (1994) , and Just, Rausser, and Zilberman (1995) divides the market supply curve into the proportion of total base acres that are enrolled in acreage have been innovative but they do not allow estimation o t curves that are not conditional on specific commodity program attributes
Previous Approaches
The first general approach uses a composite price index, sometimes c and Carter (1996) ). Although the exact formulas vary between studies, the supply-inducing price index is constructed using a weighted combination of go price and market price. This method saves degrees of freedom and reduces mu options and non-program acres and is conditional on the policy under which th observed.
A second approach is to disaggregate the time series by policy regim used by Morzuch, Weaver, and Helmberger (1980) Lucas (1976) pointed out, in order to use observed behavior under one set of policy rules to make inference about behavior under a different set of policy rules, one must consider carefully the nature of the case of farm and government payments, but also to the rules regarding program payments and planting restrictions.
To get a better handle on structural acreage response from behavior that takes place under complex farm programs, one must incorporate some degree of program complexity into the analysis. Section 3 provides the minimum required background concerning the rice program that would have existed in the absence of any program, while supply within the determined by the fraction of base acres enrolled in the program that are allowed
The participation decision itself is modeled as a function of expected net retur acreage is small relative to total plantings, as in the case of rice, the response include information only from the small and self-selected unrepresentativ outside the program. In addition, this approach does not exploit information supply behavior within the program more fully.
Theses three approaches may account for acreage response within a s program rules, but are each limited in their ability to provide inferences rega behavior related to policy reform or a yet unobserved set of policy rules. As underlying behavioral parameters that are invariant to the policy regime. In commodity programs, this idea applies not only to the distribution of prices from 1985 through 1995. Although the details below apply to a specific case, our approach can lied to obtain acreage response parameters useful for analysis of farm policy in many other
age Response
The U.S. rice program began in the 1930s with the other farm programs and has been modified periodically from that point forward. As with the other major crop programs, In fact, much of rice base in the normal flex area, which was ineligible for deficiency payments was flexed to other crops or left idle (Zulauf and Tweeten (1996) Moreover, if the structural parameters can be found, a set of policy rules can be applied and the acreage response under these rules can be recovered. This is particularly useful for considering plant from 75 percent to (perhaps) more than 100 percent of base acres, les percent to 85 percent of base less ARP was planted to rice (Optional Flex Area, producer was eligible for deficiency payments and loan gain payments on al percent of base less ARP, whether rice was planted or not. Finally, a producer w to plant rice on the flex base acreage associated with another program crop, but payments were made on such acreage, and planting rice outside a farm's rice b participation see Schnepf and Just (1995) , USDA, ERS (various years).
Uncovering Structural Supply Parameters under Explicit Program R
By structural parameters we mean the parameters of the marginal cost cu acreage allocation to rice chosen by maximizing net revenue in a market free where P is market price, Y is rice yield per acre, A is acreage planted to rice, C production and C′ is marginal cost. The left side of equation (4) We begin by defining, in more detail, the net revenue for rice producers in each of the o program options:
price is so high that, considering lon gram in order to plant additional acreage.
Comparing the supply curve traced out in Figure 1 with the linear ma een program options.
The Influenc
where the new notation and further explanation is as follows: (5) and (6) by choosin rice. The first order conditions derived from these equations provide the opti given planting option, but do not indicate whether participation in the 50/( program, two distinct net revenue functions are specified and the optima fro must be compared in determining the optimal acreage allocation. The first order conditions for maximizing net revenue define the acreage allocation to rice that maximizes net revenue within each planting option:
In ( an or equal to ends on expected
In Figure 1 , the intersection of MC and marginal revenue defines the interior optimum for the 50/85 option (A * ), where a producer may adjust acreage freely in response to changes in e results in an anting requirement.
In the normal flex option, marginal revenue is less than marginal cost, but producers are constrained by the minimum planting restriction, thus the optimum in the normal flex option is a corner solution. For the normal flex option, the first-order conditions provide a strict inequality where the marginal revenue is less than marginal cost and the producer will not adjust acreage
≤ inequality corresponds to a lower bound corner solution associated with progra restrictions. For interior optima, the first order condition will allow for the iden age response function, A(⋅), and thus identification of the structural acrea (9) and (10) The "world price" variable P w represents what growers expect about the USDA-set loan repayment rate during the weeks relevant to their own marketing of rice (truncated from above by the loan rate). We expect a positive relationship between P , which is calculated by USDA nd, and the expected the magnitude of the marginal acreage adjustments (equations (9) and (10) by these estimates are important to understanding acreage resp ampen marginal acreage response to changes in expected market price and we observe a lower acreage response to own market price.
The Choice Among Program Options
Consider the difference in net revenue between an interior acreage allocation in the (7) and (8) 
∂P. Therefore, as the expected market price increases, the hanges in favor of the er these programs, In Figure 1 , when the market price is lower so is the adjusted world price, so that the marketing loan gain is larger. Similarly, the lower market price is accompanied by a lower season average price, and a higher deficiency payment. The effect of the decrease in expected market price on area S 1 in Figure 1 is the addition of area S 1 ′ to S 1 . For the lower incentive price, anting the minimum required acreage. To check for sensitivity of the results, the participation rate and the proportions were each adjusted by ±10 percent and the simulation was re-run with very small r the average yment price were adjusted by ±20 percent again with only minor effects on results. Table 2 presents results that show the underlying structural supply acreage elasticity consistent with the within-program elasticity of 0.3. The most important numbers in Table 2 are the ratios of the structural elasticity of the acreage supply function and the program-based elasticity matches the within-program econometric estimates. As Table 1 Each column in Table 2 presents results for different values for the price relationships typically-estimated acreage response elasticity based on data conditioned on fa incentives and restrictions will be about three to four times smaller than the und acreage response elasticity. And, for rice this is a co ∂ P /∂P and ∂P w /∂P. Case 1 is based on the approximate values reported above: ∂ P /∂P = 0.75 ip between the d price and the market price expected by U.S. growers. We also considered other rela g of the structural acreage response.
The first row in Table 2 is the program acreage elasticity with respect to the incentive responds to an nd other relevant in Table 1 and the price relationships shown in the column heading, we found that a program acreage elasticity of 0.3 corresponds to the structural acreage elasticity of 0.91 (reported in row 8 of Table 2 Table 2 shows the effects of different values for the price re P /∂P is higher, the deficiency payment is expected to be smaller. The implied market elasticity of 1.14 corresponding to ∂ P /∂P = 0.75 and ∂P w /∂P = 0.75 is significantly higher than market elasticity in the base case. The next three rows in Table 2 show acreage elasticities net of produce program options. For the total program elasticity, this is equal to 0.25 in the bas elasticity is decomposed into the acreage elasticity for the producers who be These effects (incentive dampening and acreage restrictions/program options) are not additive in general. Coincidentally, the two grouped effects appear to be additive in the base case.
The results presented in Table 2 show that acreage response under complex commodity programs comprise a variety of partial responses reflecting dampening, truncation and option calculated both the acreage elasticity without the incentive dampening effe payments and without acreage restrictions and program options. These two elas reported in rows 9 and 10 in Table 2 . In the base case, the elasticity of program tionships were set to zero for this calculation for all three cases, therefore th same for the base case as well as Case 2 and Case 3.
Alternatively, we apply only the incentive dampening effect of the price rela the acreage response under price dampening will be smaller by a factor o which is (1 -0.50) = 0.50 for the base case. Thus, the incentive dampenin the elasticity by half to 0.45 (row 10). programs. We also show how common econometric estimates of acreage r modified before they can apply to analysis of deregulation or to analysis of a under alternative government programs. Given the corners and constraints with Our illustration, using data for U.S. rice, found that the structural acreage r was three to four times the magnitude of that estimated under program rules.
We show that by carefully incorporating program rules into the m understand the relationship between s simulation approach, which we also illustrate.
The complexity of program rules, the interaction of the rules with a (1996) ). A body of literature that uses simulation-based estimation techniques to combine the cal properties are omise for estimating structural acreage response parameters in the context of complex commodity programs.
detail available in mathematical programming models with desirable statisti also developing rapidly (Stern (1997) ). This approach seems to have pr nd adjusted prices.
Elasticities for each of these adjustments calculated, weighted, and summed.
• The weighting scheme, interpreted as the likelihood of observing a ±10 percent change from the initial price, follows (row = origin and column = % change)
10%
• Optimal producer program acreage calculated using the initial a -10% 10% -10% 10% -10% 10% above base 0.06 0.24; Base 0.20 0.20; 10% below base 0.24 0.06 (2000) provide perspectives on the broader literature.
5) --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

) ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2 the 92 percent that er (1996) estimate the supply response for rice with separate yield responses. Choi and Helmberger (1993b) show that the choice of planted acreage embodies most of the effect of program rules on supply. 5 In the simulation model marginal costs for each producer are indexed by individual intercepts. 6 An appendix available from the authors discusses estimation of these relationships in detail.
7 See Lin and Washington (1997) , Labson (1995 ), Rausser, et al. (1995 ), and Wang, et al. (1996 . Nerlove (1956) and Burt and Worthington (1988) should be mentioned here as they focus more on the dynamic relationships rather than response under com
In addition to the three general approaches discussed here, McIntosh and For 1994 and 1995, the program was modified such that 85 percent replaced applied in prior years. Henceforth we will refer to the program as 50/(92,85).
